Module 09 Lesson 2 of 6 🕑 ~55 min

> cat module-09-2-mfa-biometrics-fido2.md

MFA, Biometrics & FIDO2/Passkeys

Lesson 1 showed why passwords alone aren't enough. This lesson covers how organisations layer additional evidence on top — OTP, push notifications, biometrics — and why FIDO2 and passkeys go a step further by removing the shared secret altogether.

1 Multi-Factor Authentication

Multi-factor authentication requires evidence from more than one factor category (Module 9 hub, Section 3):

Something you know          Something you have
Password                +   Smartphone
Something you have          Something you know
Smart card               +  PIN

The smart card represents possession; the PIN represents knowledge — two independent categories, which is what makes it genuine MFA rather than "two things you know."

Common MFA technologies

SMS OTP
The server texts a one-time code, e.g. Your verification code is 847291. Easy to deploy and familiar to users, but weak to SIM swapping, telecom account compromise, SMS interception, and social engineering — stronger than password-only, weaker than phishing-resistant methods.
Email OTP
A code sent to the user's email. The main problem: email itself may depend on the same password or authentication session you're trying to protect.
TOTP
Time-based One-Time Passwords, generated by an authenticator app. A shared secret plus the current time feed a TOTP algorithm that produces a 6-digit code; the server independently calculates the same expected value.
Hardware OTP
Dedicated tokens generating temporary codes — still common in banks, government, defence, and legacy enterprise environments.
Push authentication
A sign-in request appears on a registered mobile device (Approve / Deny). Much better UX than typing OTP codes — but simple push approval is vulnerable to MFA fatigue, covered next.

2 MFA Fatigue, Number Matching, Step-Up & Risk-Based Auth

MFA fatigue attacks

An attacker who already knows a user's password repeatedly triggers authentication. The victim's phone shows Approve login? again and again until they approve one just to stop the notifications — also called push bombing or MFA bombing. Controls include number matching, additional context, risk-based authentication, rate limiting, device binding, and phishing-resistant authentication.

Number matching

Instead of a blind Approve button, the login screen shows a number (Enter 42 in your authenticator app) that the user must type into their device. Blind approval becomes significantly harder because the attacker's spam alone can't trick the user into matching a number they never saw.

Step-up authentication

Not every action deserves the same assurance level. A user might log into banking with password + biometric, then hit step-up authentication specifically when attempting a large transfer:

User logs into banking — password + biometric View account balance User attempts £50,000 transfer Step-up authentication required Transaction signing / stronger authentication

Common in banking, privileged administration, healthcare, government, payments and other high-value transactions.

Risk-based authentication

Modern identity platforms may evaluate context before deciding whether extra authentication is needed. A user who normally logs in from London on a corporate laptop at 09:00 suddenly logging in from an unknown device, on an anonymous network, at 03:00, from a different country, raises the calculated risk score — which can trigger a block or force stronger MFA. This is central to Zero Trust architectures (Module 8, Section 13).

3 Biometrics

Biometric authentication uses measurable physical or behavioural characteristics — fingerprint, facial recognition, iris scanning, voice recognition, palm recognition.

How biometrics work

Fingerprint
     ↓
Sensor
     ↓
Feature extraction
     ↓
Biometric template

During authentication, a new fingerprint is captured, converted into biometric data, and compared against the registered template, producing a match score:

New fingerprint
      ↓
Generate biometric data
      ↓
Compare with registered template
      ↓
Match score

The system decides whether the match score clears an acceptable threshold.

False acceptance and false rejection

Biometric systems are probabilistic, not a simple exact match:

False Acceptance Rate
The probability an unauthorised person is incorrectly accepted.
False Rejection Rate
The probability a legitimate user is incorrectly rejected.

Organisations tune this threshold to balance security against usability — too strict and legitimate users get locked out constantly; too loose and impostors get through.

Biometrics should usually remain local

Modern devices typically keep biometric data on the device rather than transmitting fingerprints or facial images to a remote server:

Application
      ↓
Request biometric verification
      ↓
Device secure hardware
      ↓
Fingerprint/Face verified locally
      ↓
Cryptographic key unlocked

The server receives cryptographic proof, not the user's actual fingerprint. This design is fundamental to modern passwordless authentication, covered next.

4 FIDO2 & Passkeys

FIDO2 (Fast IDentity Online) is one of the most important developments in modern authentication, combining WebAuthn (lets browsers/web apps talk to authenticators) and CTAP (lets devices talk to external authenticators like security keys) to enable strong public-key-based authentication.

Public-key authentication in FIDO2

Traditional passwords use a shared secret the server must store. FIDO2 uses asymmetric cryptography instead — the private key never leaves the authenticator.

FIDO2 registration and authentication flow with an animated signal travelling from authenticator to server and back Authenticator Service / Server 1. Registration: public key sent Private key stays on device Public key stored by service 2. Login: server sends challenge Sign challenge with private key Verify signature with public key

The moving dot traces one full round trip: public key registered → server challenges → authenticator signs → server verifies. The private key never travels.

Why FIDO2 is phishing-resistant

A fake website can ask Username: / Password: and a victim can accidentally hand both over. FIDO credentials are cryptographically bound to the legitimate service — a credential registered for login.company.com cannot simply be replayed against login-company-security.example. This is what "phishing-resistant" actually means in practice, not just "harder to phish."

Hardware security keys

A physical security key (USB-A, USB-C, NFC, or Bluetooth) can act as a FIDO authenticator:

Administrator
      ↓
Opens cloud admin portal
      ↓
Enters username
      ↓
Security key requested
      ↓
Touches security key
      ↓
Cryptographic authentication
      ↓
Access granted

High-risk organisations commonly issue these to domain admins, cloud admins, security teams, developers, executives, and privileged access workstations.

User presence vs user verification

User presence
Confirms a human intentionally interacted with the authenticator, e.g. touching the security key.
User verification
Verifies the specific person's identity, e.g. fingerprint, PIN, or face.

A FIDO device can therefore require possession of the authenticator plus a PIN or biometric — presence and verification combined.

Passkeys

Passkeys are a modern implementation of FIDO-based passwordless authentication, using public-key cryptography instead of a server-stored password:

Website
   ↓
Passkey request
   ↓
Phone/Laptop
   ↓
Face/Fingerprint/PIN
   ↓
Private key signs challenge
   ↓
Server verifies signature

The user never needs to remember or type a password.

Device-bound vs synced passkeys

Device-bound credentials stay tied to one authenticator or device — strong control, common in enterprise deployments. Synced passkeys are synchronised across a user's trusted ecosystem, improving usability since users don't lose access when replacing a device — the more common consumer approach.

Enterprise challenges with passkeys

Passkeys dramatically improve security, but organisations still have to solve: employee onboarding, lost devices, account recovery, shared workstations, privileged administrator accounts, contractors, cross-platform compatibility, device management, regulatory requirements, and help-desk recovery procedures. Passwordless technology doesn't eliminate identity management — it changes how identity is proved.

Lab Lab 1 – Walk Through an MFA Login

🦡 Hands-on lab

Create a lab user and configure MFA using any available identity platform (a free tier of Microsoft Entra ID, Google Workspace, or even a personal account with an authenticator app all work fine). Walk through and record the complete flow:

🔮 Do this, then note what you observed

1. Username entered · 2. Password validated · 3. MFA challenge initiated · 4. MFA challenge approved · 5. Authentication completed · 6. Session created.

Then repeat with: an incorrect password; a correct password + rejected MFA; a correct password + expired OTP; a correct password + successful MFA.

Reveal what to look for

Compare the resulting sign-in logs for each case — most identity platforms log the password result and the MFA result as separate events. Notice that a rejected or expired MFA challenge produces a distinctly different log entry from a wrong password, which is exactly the kind of detail a SOC analyst relies on when investigating a suspicious login (Module 8, Section 16).

Lab Lab 2 – Register and Use a Passkey

🦡 Hands-on lab

Register a passkey with any test service that supports WebAuthn (many major platforms now offer this in account security settings). Observe the registration step (key pair generated, public key registered), then authenticate again and observe the login step (challenge → biometric/PIN verification → cryptographic signature → server verification).

🔮 Predict first

Compare this to password authentication. What reusable secret did you send to the server during login?

Reveal the answer

With a properly implemented FIDO/passkey flow, the answer is essentially none — you sent a signature proving you hold the private key, not the key itself, and not a password. That's the fundamental difference from every authentication method covered so far in this module.

Lesson Outcome

You should now be able to compare MFA technologies by strength (SMS/email OTP < TOTP/push < FIDO2/passkeys), explain why MFA fatigue defeats simple push approval and how number matching helps, and explain why FIDO2/passkeys are considered phishing-resistant in a way password + OTP never fully is. Lesson 3 moves from "how a human proves who they are" to "how one system lets an application access another system on a user's behalf" — OAuth and OpenID Connect.